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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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the best form of organising the economic and cultural development of the
country in the years of peaceful construction-, but also the best form of
mobilising all the forces of the people for resistance to the enemy in war-
time. Soviet power established twenty-six years ago has transformed our
country, within a short period, into an impregnable fortress. The Red
Army has the most stable and reliable rear of all the armies in the world.
" There is no doubt that the Soviet State will emerge from the war even
stronger and more consolidated."
Stalin's c Soviet people ' were fighting not only for Russia, but for the
Soviet system as well, a system which has nothing in common with the
democracy of the western world. In his Order of the Day on November 6,
Stalin outlined his future policy after a victory had been achieved.
According to him, " the peoples of Europe, liberated from the Fascist
invaders " and " dismembered by the Fascist enslavers " were to have
the "full rights and freedom to determine their own form of Government."
Yet since the era of the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk in 1918, this e full
rights and freedom ' was known to consist of the right of the peoples to
acclaim only Communism; it was as equally well-known from the out-
come of those c plebiscites ' held in Eastern Poland and in the Baltic
States in 1939-1940. And would soon be known yet again when the
Red Army entered East and Central Europe.
Such were the different creeds of those partners who met in Moscow
and Teheran in November, 19433 i*1 order to arrive at an agreement on a
future action regarding the final victory over Germany, and the exploita-
tion of that victory.
Such were the creeds of these representatives of the opposite c polar
centres.' But what were they trying to achieve at this juncture of the
war ? The propaganda of the Soviets supplied the answer : " foil
security for Russia,3' or, in plain language, / a zone of security.' The
Kremlin's interpretation of these terms was—the subordination of this
zone to its rule i.e., annexation disguised by lofty slogans. " The
foreign interests of the liberated European States," announced Moscow,
" will be established on the basis of security against Germany " and
" mutual confidence and mutual assistance." So, in plain language, the
Soviet Bonaparte wanted:—(a) the agreement of the partners to his
re-annexation of the Eastern part of the Middle Zone, the same areas
which he previously had under his pact with Hitler; (b) a much more
extensive territory in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, i.e., the re-
mainder of the Middle Zone, including Eastern Germany, within this
sphere of security. Yugoslavia and Austria were to be under the control
of both England and Russia.
The Atlantic partners' territorial demands in Europe were exactly nil,
and their hopes of witnessing a real freedom for the liberated countries
of liberated Europe were of no interest to Stalin, as France, Belgium,
Holland—£ the decaying West,' Italy, Spain, all those countries were
unable to produce any real force. He was apparently quite willing to